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ABSTRACT: Are the available conceptual foundations, the statistical techniques, and the 
empirical data of cognitive neuroscience sufficiently robust to serve as foundations for an 
overarching neuroreductionist explanation of the mind-brain relationship? There are two main 
approaches to answering this question that dominate cognitive neuroscience these days. The 
first is based on accumulated macroneural measurements such as those produced by brain 
imaging equipment. The alternative is the approach epitomized by the Hebb Conjecture (1949) 
that asserts that it is most likely that cognitive processes of all kinds are instantiated in the 
concurrent microneural state of a huge assembly of individual neurons whose coordinated 
action is the neural equivalent of mental activity. Although there is currently insufficient 
evidence at the microneural level to robustly support the Hebb conjecture, it is widely accepted 
that Hebb’s approach is probably correct—cognition is a result of the activity of independent, 
but interacting, neurons that maintain their individual identity. The problem is that both of 
these approaches are deeply flawed for methodological, conceptual, and empirical reasons. 
One reason is that simple models composed of a few neurons may simulate behavior but 
actually be based on completely different neuronal interactions.  Therefore, the current best 
answer to the question asked in the title of this contribution is–probably not.  
Key words: behavior, cognition, neuroreductionism, theory 
In the last three decades, cognitive neuroscience has undergone a revolution in 
substance and available technology. With the invention of functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) by Ogawa, Lee, Kay, and Tank (1990), brain images 
using Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) measures have largely replaced 
traditional methods involving surgery, trauma, stimulation, and electrophysiological 
recording and a number of methodological breakthroughs. The earliest application of 
the fMRI technique to cognitive neuroscience is generally considered to have been 
published by Belliveau et al (1991) during which attempts were made to map out the 
visual cortex. Currently, the number of papers that deal specifically with comparisons 
of cognitive processes and brain images is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, it is 
obvious that experiments comparing fMRI responses and cognitive processes have 
gone from virtually nothing in the early 1990’s to tens of thousands in the 2000’s 
(e.g., Bandettini 2007; Aue, Lavelle & Cacioppo, 2009). 
Because these cognitively related fMRI images are brain responses, more or less 
correlated with cognitive processes, there is a compelling face validity presented to 
researchers by these results. The promise is that we are on the verge of a breakthrough 
to the profound and hitherto unsolved mind-brain problem.  The face validity of mind-
brain equivalence is, however, countervailed by a pervasive logical error that 
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incorrectly assumes that because the mind is a brain process, any brain activity 
correlated with cognitive activity must be relevant. At the least, it has been expected 
that correlations could be found between cognitive and neural responses that might 
serve as heuristics for future theories of mind-brain relationships. Despite the large 
number of publications and the large number of investigators working with the fMRI 
and similar macroneural tools, no clear path using this approach to an overarching 
theory of the mind-brain relation has yet appeared—only piece-wise correlations 
between particular locales.  
The major alternative approach—the Hebbian, microneural conjecture—based on 
the concurrent activity of a large number of individual neurons is currently attracting 
considerable attention and importance in light of the plan by the current United States 
administration to invest billions of dollars into the task of recording every spike from 
every neuron in the brain of a behaving organism. The development in the past few 
years of powerful computers has raised the possibility that sheer numerousness may 
not be the hindrance thought until only recently. However, the practical and 
computational aspects of large scale computer simulations of the brain suggest that 
even the largest computers may not provide an answer to how brain activity accounts 
for mental activity. 
The possibility of an overarching theory of or explanation of how phenomena 
measured behaviorally are related to neurophysiological measures remains 
contentious. Many contemporary philosophers have adopted a conservative point of 
view with regard to the tractability issue on logical grounds including Rakover (2011), 
McGinn (1989), Ludwig, (2003), and Dietrich and Hardcastle (2005). These and other 
scholars have arrived at a conclusion of theoretical intractability. (Strong, unequivocal 
quotes from these scholars and others arguing on both in principal and current in 
practice bases can be found in Rakover’s article). On the other hand, contemporary 
scholars such as Churchland (1994), Bechtel (2002), and Bickle, (2003) have 
compellingly argued that although the problem is difficult, it probably will be solved 
as our knowledge of neurophysiology expands. 
There are also many philosophical points of view that seek to find some kind of a 
relationship between neurophysiology and mental activity that, I believe, do not 
constitute neuroreductionist explanation in the sense I use here. For example, such 
concepts as “identity” (Fiegl, 1958) and the classic idea of “emergence” of complex 
phenomena from simpler phenomena finesse the problem by excluding the specific 
processes of the transformation from one level to another and, thus, do not offer a 
possible path to mechanistic explanation. Similarly, a number of other philosophical 
ideas such as “supervenience” (Kim, 1993) accept the argument that lower level 
mechanisms determine higher level properties but do not identify the specific 
mechanisms that must lie in the heart of such a neuroreductionist explanation. Such 
logical arguments concern only generalities about relationships and, therefore, do not 
offer specific explanations of the transformation processes that can account for the 
emergence of the mental from the neural (or, better stated, the transformation from 
one to the other). Although physicalist in principle, they are nonreductive in practice. 
Such ideas are actually metaphors that help us to conceptualize but are not 
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explanations in the sense implied here; they are much better considered to be 
definitions or ontological premises. 
To sharpen the following discussion, it is desirable to define what I mean by 
“neurally reductive” and “nonreductive approaches,” respectively. By a neurally 
reductive explanation, I refer to a transformation of the properties of a lower level 
(such as the action of the brain or its constituent parts) to the properties of higher level 
phenomena (such as cognitive module that may be inferred from behavior).x In a 
practical sense, this would mean that manipulation of neurophysiological properties 
and measures so as to reproduce or cause behavioral properties and measures that 
would allow us to infer underlying mental activity of the kind designated as 
hypothetical constructs; in other words to solve the mind-brain problem. It is very 
important to appreciate that the “cognitive processes” are not directly observable and 
can only be indirectly inferred from publically observable behavior. 
Neuroreductionism assumes that the sum of the neural parts and interactions in 
some way cause or become the mental experience. How they do so is the core of a 
neuroreductionist explanation. Neuroreductionism does not imply dualism; instead 
both levels of analysis are assumed to be manifestations of a single level of physical 
reality—a monism without which cognitive neuroscience cannot survive. A 
nonreductive approach would solely concentrate on the parts and properties of the 
higher level (e.g., cognitive processes) and eschew attempts to demonstrate how those 
of the lower level (e.g. neural properties) produce or become those of the higher level. 
An analogy may be drawn between the kind of neuroreductionism I consider here 
and a much simpler explanation from the physical world. The macroscopic properties 
of a plastic can be almost entirely explained by the interaction of the properties of the 
microscopic molecules that are polymerized to produce the plastic. In this analog, 
what we know about the properties of the constituent molecules (and their 
interactions) permits a full reductive explanation of the properties of the macroscopic 
materials they produce. It is this kind of explanation to which cognitive 
neuroscientists ideally aspire. Unfortunately, the present limitations of our science 
suggest that because of its complexity no such explanation is on the foreseeable 
horizon. 
The following discussion is intended to alert us to some of the conceptual, 
procedural, and empirical challenges encountered in the search for a neuroreductionist 
explanation of cognitive activity. At this point it is not possible to definitively 
determine whether or not the problem is tractable in any general scientific sense. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the identified barriers to progress do at least raise the 
possibility that current efforts to develop an overarching neuroreductionist theory of 
mind-brain may not be obtainable. If the goal of an overarching theory can be shown 
to be currently unrealistic, then psychology may wish to reorient itself, at least for the 
time being, toward a nonreductionist approach to the study of cognitive processes; one 
that would emphasize the observation and description of behavior without the neural 




Conceptual Barriers To Theory Building 
Many of the barriers to the development of neuroreductive explanation in 
cognitive neuroscience are matters of deep dispute about the fundamental nature of 
the scientific method. Hopeful expressions of the inevitability of future discoveries, 
speculative findings, and “converging methods” are often raised as keys to problem 
solutions already known to be intractable (e.g., Moore, 1956). Past successes in theory 
development in the physical sciences are often touted as harbingers of success in 
cognitive neuroscience despite the fact that physics deals with uniform forces (e.g., 
gravity) that are orders of magnitude simpler than the interactions observed in brain 
tissue. 
In this section I deal with some of the often overlooked conceptual issues that 
arise when we ask the question of the plausibility of neuroreductionist explanations of 
cognitive activity.   
Level of Analysis 
A major property of any proposed explanation concerns the level of analysis at 
which a problem is conceptualized. By” level,” I refer to both the scale at which brain 
activity becomes cognitive activity and the scale of our analyses and measurements. In 
the present context, the Hebbian microneural level of analysis entails responses of 
cellular and subcellular units such as neurons and synapses and their respective 
idiosyncratic interactions. (A macroneural level of analysis, on the other hand, deals 
with signals that are pools or accumulations of these lower level responses.)   
Microneural level interactions are the bases of the Hebb conjecture (Hebb, 
1949)—a conceptualization that assumes that cognitive processes emerge from the 
unpooled (i.e., that their magnitudes are not just added together), but interacting, 
action of millions if not billions of neurons and the thousand-fold greater number of 
synaptic connections. Macroneural-level based theories, on the other hand, seek to 
overcome the sheer numerousness of individual neurons by pooling (either 
statistically or in terms of their magnitudes) the microneural results into composite 
measures such as fMRI images or EEG recordings. Each of these levels of analysis is 
beset with its own difficulties and challenges. 
For example, to establish the validity of a Hebb-type microneural theory requires 
that we control and measure the individual activities of a very large number of 
neurons. We would have to identify many, if not most, of the neurons that are 
involved in a cognitive process and then provide some means of stimulating and then 
recording from them individually in order to provide the essential empirical data. This 
is necessary since each neuron in the microneural network acts in its own 
idiosyncratic manner even as it presumably contributes to the ensemble response. In 
other words, the ensemble of interacting neurons acts as a “super-register” in 
computer terminology—a collection of units that maintains their individual identity 
while collectively accounting for the properties of the system. A simulation that 
results in a behavior is not tantamount to an explanatory theory. A full blown Hebb-
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type theory would not be satisfied by a less than exhaustive description—if that is the 
way the mind emerges from the brain. 
Complexity 
Obviously, achieving these connections would be a technical tour de force of the 
first magnitude given that our limited ability to develop microelectrode arrays suitable 
for stimulation and/or recording is currently limited to a few hundred (e.g., Wark et al, 
2013). Furthermore, the amount of data obtained from even a few hundred 
microelectrodes would tax available computational capabilities as complex patterns of 
response exponentially proliferate. 
Despite the fact that we must consider the study of any microneural network in 
this direct manner (manipulating and recording individual neuronal responses) to be 
far beyond current technology, it is at least possible to consider the criteria that would 
have to be applied to determine either its necessity or sufficiency. Martin, Grimwood, 
and Morris (2000) have suggested four criteria by means of which such a Gedanken 
experiment would have to be evaluated to support a particular microneural theory (a 
“synaptic plasticity and memory” hypothesis in their terms). They carry out this 
conceptual exercise for learning and memory, but the four formal criteria they 
proposed hold true for any microneural, neuronal network experiment. I reconstruct 
them here to more closely fit the present discussion. 
 
Table 1 
Four Formal Criteria for Support of Microneuronal Network Theory of Cognition 
(Based on Martin, Grimwood, and Morris’, 2000, Discussion in the Context of 
Learning and Memory) 
(1) Detectability: Changes in the cognitive process must be accompanied by 
detectable changes in the organization of the supposed neural network.  
(2) Mimicry: If the same neuronal network state observed during some cognitive 
process can be reconstructed, then the same cognitive process should reoccur. 
(3) Anterograde Alteration: Anything that prevents relevant neural activity also 
should prevent the associated cognitive process. 
(4) Retrograde Alteration: Any changes in a preexisting neuronal network state 
should alter the cognitive experience.    
Obviously, for a host of procedural and instrumentation reasons, experiments to 
meet these criteria would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to carry out. Others 
have argued that any proposed attempt to study the brain at this minute level is beyond 
both our technology and our mathematics (Lichtman & Denk, 2011). Their reasons 
include; (1) the immense diversity of cell types in the brain; (2) the idiosyncratic 
nature of cellular responses in both space and time; (3) the scale difference between 
microscopic neurons and their extent over vast macroscopic regions of the brain (brain 
must be studied “over sizes that span six orders of magnitude,” p. 620); and (4) the 
overwhelming flood of data at the microneural level. 
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Because of these technical and procedural limitations, the direct, brute force, 
microneural strategy of stimulating and recording from the necessary individual 
components of a microneural network is not likely to ever be implemented despite the 
advent of supercomputers of enormous power. Microneural level theory building in 
such a many-neuron environment is severely inhibited because of the practical 
problems associated with processing a representative number of neurons. Even if we 
could assemble such an experiment, we would be dealing with so much data, that it 
would be for all practical purposes inaccessible. (On the other hand, at the 
macroneural level typified by fMRI images, the necessary microneural data is also 
inaccessible, but for a different reason—it no longer exists; it has been averaged out of 
existence.) Thus, the possibility of developing an authentic, valid, overarching 
microneural Hebb-type explanation based on empirical evidence that truly speaks to 
the question of how the brain encodes mental activity appears to be remote. 
Regardless of which level of analysis one is considering, the combinatorial 
complexity of the brain stresses any putative explanation of its operation to its limits.  
The complexity issue has been known for years. It takes very few interacting 
neurons to pose an intractable combinatoric problem for any currently conceivable 
method of analysis. Stockmeyer and Chandra (1979), among others showed how very 
simple network problems (e.g., minimizing a travelling salesman’s itinerary) could 
require hyper-astronomical processing times. For example, other estimates suggested 
that if the salesman had as few as 21 stops, an exhaustive solution to the problem 
would require 77,000 years of computer time. 
Karp (1986), a prominent complexity theorist, reported that the intractability of 
many other superficially simple combinatorial problems, many of which were analogs 
of those faced in cognitive neuroscience, had been rigorously demonstrated by 
mathematicians.  
Koch (2012) recently put this problem into a cognitive neuroscience perspective 
when he calculated that the time required to “exhaustively describe a [neural] system” 
would grow faster than exponentially. He calculated that the two million neurons of 
the visual cortex of a mouse would require a computer system running for 10 million 
years even if computer power was simultaneously growing at the modern rate 
specified by Gordon Moore’s law (“the number of registers or gates that can be 
packed on a standard size computer chip doubles roughly every 2 years.”) Koch did 
go on to note that there were some simplifying conditions that could speed up the 
process by a few orders of magnitude but the processing time remained enormous. 
Beyond sheer numerousness and nonlinearity, many early theories of neural nets 
do not scale up well. The eventual collapse of the small neuronal network program in 
the 1980’s when attempts were made to scale up the number of synthetic neurons 
beyond one hundred was probably an unavoidable outcome of this intrinsic instability. 
Loss Of Information With Response Accumulation 
In such a situation, in which an exhaustive, direct microneural (neuron by 
neuron) analysis is currently beyond our technical abilities, cognitive neuroscientists 
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have turned to available macroneural cumulative measures (e.g., the fMRI) and 
effectively let nature do the sums for us. How the cumulative process works in which 
microneuronal responses are cumulated neurophysiologically is not completely 
understood but it may involve summations of either local potentials (e.g., Logothetis 
et al, 2001) or spike action potentials (e.g., Mukamel et al, 2005). 
Unfortunately, it seems likely that the cognitively salient microneural 
information is not preserved in macroneural level measurements. Once added or 
accumulated into pooled responses, the simplest arithmetic ideas (e.g., what two 
numbers are added together to provide a sum) argue that they cannot be retrieved. 
Thus, there is an inescapable ambiguity about the origins of any macroneural signal 
formed from accumulations of microneural activity—a huge variety of different 
configurations of microneural neuronal activities may produce exactly the same 
macroneural response. This means that scores based on differences between control 
and experimental macroneural responses cannot discriminate between quite different 
microneural brain states.  
The implication of this insensitivity to differences is that that macroneural fMRI 
images are neutral with regard to their microneural origins. This is the fundamental 
weakness of the macroneural approach if the Hebbian conjecture of microneural 
coding of cognition is correct; the critical microneural information essential to 
understanding the transition from brain activity to cognitive activity has been lost. Of 
course, if the Hebb conjecture is wrong, loss of microneural information may not be 
consequential.    
Underdetermination    
Another classic conceptual issue serving as a barrier to theory building is 
generically referred to as “underdetermination.”  Underdetermination implies there is 
insufficient information in the results available from an experiment or group of 
experiments to answer the salient questions for which the research was carried out. 
This is a constraint operating in almost all scientific enterprises; however, it is 
particularly exacerbated in cognitive neuroscience because of the multitude of 
plausible and possible alternative neuronal configurations that could underlie an 
observable behavior. However, it is more likely that most of the effects of 
underdetermination are due to the fundamental conceptual difficulty that the 
information necessary to definitively answer a cognitive neuroscience question is not 
accessible from macroneural or behavioral measurements. This is a theorem of 
automata theory (Moore, 1956) that is not well known to cognitive scientists but has 
been extensively discussed by scholars such as Duhem (1914) and Quine (1951). 
Moore puts it this way: 
Given any [closed] machine S and any multiple experiment performed on S, there 
exist other machines [internal mechanisms] experimentally indistinguishable from S 
for which the original experiment would have had the same outcome … This result 
means that it will never be possible to perform experiments on a completely 
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unknown machine which will suffice to identify it from among the class of all 
sequential machines. (p.140) 
As an example of how this may apply to cognitive neuroscience, Hilgetag, 
O’Neil, and Young (1996) have argued on purely mathematical grounds that complex 
networks such as those proposed by Van Essen, Anderson, and Felleman (1992) for 
the primate visual system cannot be placed in a unique hierarchy of activation order 
because the outcomes are fundamentally underdetermined. As a result carrying out 
additional experiments leads, paradoxically, to an increase in the number of possible 
but incorrect theories at a rate that exceeds the number of new experiments that can be 
designed. In short, simply collecting more data may not always help to resolve issues 
of underlying mechanism if the data are underdetermined; indeed, it may exacerbate 
the problem. 
False Analogies Between Sensory, Motor, And Cognitive Processes 
Another conceptual barrier encountered in the effort to formulate theories 
relating neural and cognitive processes is the false analogy often drawn between 
successes in explaining sensory and motor processes, on the one hand, and the much 
more complicated matter of understanding cognitive representation. However, the two 
tasks are entirely different. Peripheral sensory and motor signal transmission is 
characterized by a mainly unidirectional flow of information (although with some 
centrifugal influences), relatively simple dimensional correlations between stimuli and 
neural responses, as well as between stimuli and perceived experiences, and tight 
linkages to physical dimensions and measures. Thus, it is possible, to ask and answer 
a question such as—what is the neurophysiological code used by the peripheral 
nervous system to transmit information about the magnitude or quality of a stimulus to 
more central regions of the brain? The physical dimensions of both the stimulus and 
the neural response are measurable in units for which the physical sciences have 
provided well established values such as lumens, decibels, on the one hand and 
frequency and pattern of firing on the other. Furthermore, psychophysicists such as 
Brindley (1960) note that techniques for quantifying sensory responses require and 
can utilize but the simplest of “Class A” discriminative responses—simple “same” or 
“different” judgments. Furthermore, the microanatomy of the peripheral sensory and 
motor pathways is much simpler than of those more intricate and interwoven central 
mechanisms that are presumably involved in cognitive processes and, therefore, 
compelling results were promptly forthcoming.  
These simplifying conditions do not hold for cognitive process such as “decision 
making” or “emotion.” When the neural coding idea was transferred to cognitive 
processes, the result was general disappointment; none of the simplifying anchors that 
provided conceptual order to the transmission codes existed in the complex and 
irregular networks underlying higher level cognitive processes.  The result was that 
successes in understanding these sensory and motor information transmission 
processes would not assure the tractability of central processing mechanisms. A 
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similar distinction can be made between old and new phylogenetic regions of the 
brain; the former being susceptible to functional analyses and the latter being opaque 
to them. 
Poor Definition Of Cognitive Constructs     
For science to achieve a high level of theoretical precision there is a profound 
need that the dimensions and properties of its variables be precisely defined. Yet, 
psychology is replete with poorly defined terms such as attention, thinking, emotion, 
and consciousness at a high level of abstraction and words such as learning, 
recognition, detection, retrieval, and conditioning defined more operationally. Many 
cognitive terms have multiple meanings that vary with the particular goals of the 
research. For example, Vimal (2009) tabulated 40 different meanings of the word 
“consciousness.” Uttal (2011), as another example, listed 41 different meanings of the 
word “learning.” The ultimate problem, however, is that none of these fluctuating 
cognitive terms need necessarily map directly onto neural mechanisms. That is, what 
is a fundamental elemental process or faculty to a psychologist may mean something 
very different to the brain. In short, our behavioral taxonomies and those of the brain 
may not be speaking the same language, and no Rosetta stone translating between 
them is possible. 
An alternative way of emphasizing how this lack of isomorphism between 
cognitive and neural vocabularies affects our thinking has been provided by 
investigators such as Oosterwijk et al. (2012). They support the main alternative 
hypothesis—namely that psychological constructs are encoded by a distributed pattern 
of general purpose neural mechanisms. One implication of such a conclusion is that, 
however much we may seek to modularize our psychological taxonomies, there is no 
reason to assume that the mental components are parsed in the same way by the 
nervous system. In Oosterwijk et al’s words—“the brain does not respect faculty 
psychology categories.” (p. 2110). It should be noted that the kind of distributed 
neural network described by Oosterwijk et al is very different than the classic PDP 
model of decades ago. 
The Neurologizing Of Psychological Language 
A property of many psychological theories is the casual introduction of 
neurophysiological terminology into their discussions without adequate empirical 
linkage. Behavioral hypothetical constructs are supplemented by neural concepts and 
findings based on little more than analogies and borrowed language. Skinner (1950) 
referred to this use of unsubstantiated neurophysiological concepts as a “Conceptual 
Nervous Systems” (CNS) noting that “many theorists point out that they are not 
talking about the nervous system as an actual structure undergoing physiological or 
bio-chemical changes but only as a system with a certain dynamic output.” (p. 194)  
What it appears that many investigators are doing is to develop plausible, but 
highly speculative, “hypothetical constructs” that could, in principle, describe the 
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behavior. The hypothetical mechanisms are then associated with similar 
neurophysiological findings or redefined in neurophysiological terminology. At best, 
theories of this type are heuristics that are not likely to rise from preliminary 
hypotheses to robust neural theories. It seems appropriate that we should be 
reevaluating the important insight about the CNS offered by Skinner and distinguish 
between robust neurophysiological entities and neural “nicknames” for sometimes 
ingenious hypothetical constructs. 
The Search For Objectivity 
Despite the difficulty in defining or measuring inaccessible cognitive entities 
such as thoughts, feelings, experiences and perceptions, there has been a persistent 
historical effort to seek out objective “hard science” correlates—in particular, brain 
responses—of cognitive processes. The fundamental ontological premise of all such 
efforts has been the physicalist assumption that psychological activity is the outcome 
of brain activity in some so far indefinable way. Few cognitive neuroscientists would 
disagree with this point. However, there is an epistemological corollary of this 
assumption that is a matter of greater contention. Namely, can any measurement that 
is made of brain processes be theoretically transparent to cognitive activity? That is—
are objective macroneural measurements such as the fMRI or the EEG capable of 
representing the neural basis of cognitive activity adequately to serve as an 
“explanation” of that activity?  The answer to this question is probably not in the 
strong sense of “explanation” I use here. Many “objective” measurements of brain 
activity are simply going to be irrelevant to the mind-brain problem and are, therefore, 
invalid as measures of cognitive activity. Studies of the chemistry of neurons and 
synapses, microscopic investigations of structure, and single cell recordings (e.g., see 
Bickle, 2006) tell us little about the cognitively meaningful information processing 
activity of what is increasingly likely to occur in interactions among neurons situated 
at widely distributed portions of the whole brain. It is not the molecular chemistry of 
neurons nor of synapses that might open the door to understanding how the brain 
works as a cognitive engine; it is more likely to be the aggregate information 
processing by a large number of neurons whose coordinated (but not physically 
cumulative) states account for the emergence of mental activity. 
Statistical And Reporting Barriers To Theory Building 
In addition to these conceptual issues, the complexity of the statistical procedures 
required to extract meaningful conclusions from both macroneural and microneural 
observations is such that there is ample opportunity for statistical artifacts to lead to 
erroneous conclusions. These errors come in many guises–some are very simple 
computational oversights and some are properties of statistics well known to 
statisticians if not to cognitive neuroscientists. Many of these difficulties with 
statistical and reporting methodologies are common to all levels of cognitive 
neuroscience, both macro-and microneural, as well as in many other forms of purely 
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psychological research. Indeed, statistical problems are common in many other 
sciences. I concentrate here, however, on a few of those statistical problems that have 
been identified as being particularly troublesome to macroneural neuroreductionist 
theory development. Because these sources of bias and artifact have been discussed 
extensively in the literature, I simply summarize them (and some of the evidence that 
they remain major problems for macroneural methodologies) in the following list. My 
general point is that there are major problems with the most basic aspects of cognitive 
neuroscience—particularly the reproducibility and validity of its empirical 
observations. Some of these sources of bias will, of course, be overcome by further 
technical developments; others, however, may represent constraints on theoretical 
progress that are much more fundamental.  
(1) Inadequate reporting of cognitive neuroscience experimental methods that 
prevent replication (Carp, 2012a; 2012b). 
(2) Alternate computation of cognitive neuroscientific analytic trajectories 
produce different conclusions from the same initial conditions (Carp, 2012a; 
2012b). 
(3) Ignoring the number of tests (Bennett et al, 2009; 2011 in cognitive 
neuroscience experiments; Genovese, Lazar, and Nichols (2002); Loring et 
al (2002). Bennett et al (2011), for example, reviewed a sample of relevant 
literature and found that only 60-75% of the articles made the needed 
correction even using an approximate correction (Holm, 1979).  
(4) Inadequate sample size (Ihnen et al, 2009; Wager et al (2009). The latter 
investigators pointed out that in 415 early cognitive neuroscience studies an 
average of only 11 or 12 subjects was used and in some cases as few as 4 or 
5. 
(5) Double dipping (Vul et al, 2009; Vul and Kanwisher, 2010; Kriegeskorte et 
al 2009; Fiedler, 2011). Double dipping comes in many guises, for example 
in the form of functional localizers that predefine salient areas and, thus, 
bias cognitive neuroscience analyses (Friston et al, 2010 and Saxe, Bret, and 
Kanwisher, 2006). Other subtle forms of double dipping include not 
controlling for intertrial (Goldfine et al, 2013) or intervoxel (Loring et al, 
2002) dependencies; ignoring nonlinear interactions between spontaneous 
and evoked responses (He, 2013); and injudicious use of packaged analysis 
programs that have built-in biases of this kind (Joppa et al, 2013) 
(6) Erroneously comparing significances when one is significant and the other is 
not (Gelman and Stern, 2006). In a study of this phenomenon, Nieuwenhuis, 
Forstmann, and Wagenmakers (2011) examined 513 articles from first line 
neuroscience journals and discovered that approximately 15 percent 
incorrectly judged a difference between a significant and an insignificant 
distribution as being significant. This error, according to Nieuwenhuis and 
his colleagues is “especially common in the neuroimaging literature.” (p. 
1107) 
(7) General inadequacies of the ubiquitous Null Hypothesis Significance Test 
(NHST) (Greenwald et al, 1996; Lieberman and Cunningham, 2009; and 
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Lambdin, 2012 among many others) especially when applied to cognitive 
neuroscience experiments. Eklund et al (2012) reevaluated 1484 data sets 
that had previously been generated to examine the rest activity of the brain. 
All of these data sets were expected to have little significant cognitive 
related activity and, thus, approximately 5% false positive responses among 
the 1484 experiments. Eklund and his colleagues, however, found that 
significance rates actually ranged from 1% to 70%. 
(8) Lurking in the background, of course, is the underappreciated but ever 
present problem of mistaking “correlation for causation” (Yule, 1899)—a 
caveat long understood and yet often violated by cognitive psychologists.  
 
Of course, in a certain sense, these are technical matters discussed by statistically 
oriented scientists in many fields that may someday be overcome by the invention of 
improved methods. However, the point is that much of the current corpus of findings 
concerning mind-brain relations is suspect as a result of subtle and not so subtle 
statistical artifacts that challenge their most basic validity. All of the examples I allude 
to are framed in the context of cognitive neuroscience.  By themselves, these 
statistical deficiencies do not provide a compelling argument against 
neuroreductionism; however, they do suggest that the current situation is filled with 
what are nonreplicable and invalid findings and that the case for a future 
neuroreductionist explanation of cognitive processes is still problematical. 
Empirical Barriers To Theory Building 
Conceptual and statistical sources of difficulty notwithstanding, the most 
compelling influences on theory development are and should be the empirical results. 
Should the results of equivalent experiments not be consistent, no effort at synthesis 
or prediction can possibly bear fruit. Although science often acts in an indirect or 
heuristic manner and the path from data to meaningful understanding is sometime 
convoluted and indirect, its ultimate great successes rest on a foundation of 
replicability and validity.  
In recent years, a substantial body of new findings has raised doubts about some 
of the most basic assumptions of cognitive neuroscience. In this section, I discuss 
some of the changes occurring in the field that should have an impact on theory 
building.   
The Case Against Macroneural Localization   
The main goal of cognitively related brain imaging research in the two-plus 
decades since fMRI methods were introduced has been to determine the spatial 
localization and extent of activation regions or nodes that selectively respond during 
particular cognitive activities. In some of the early forms of this idea, the nodes were 
isolated from each other and the goal was simply to map modular cognitive processes 
on local brain regions. When subsequent research (starting about the year 2000) 
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revealed that more than one brain region was almost always associated with every 
cognitive process, the working metaphor about brain organization began to change. In 
this new stage, the emerging metaphor became one of interacting, sparsely distributed, 
multiple, non-specific regions of the brain. 
The very important question now arises—do localized focal regions or nodes 
actually exist? Recent work is beginning to suggest that the metaphor of nodes or 
localized activation regions is, in fact, not the way the brain is actually organized. The 
alternative view, expressed by Lindquist et al (2012), among others, is that the brain 
operates in a much more distributed and holistic fashion, as well as less specialized, 
than previously suspected. 
This is not to suggest any mass action or continuous equipotential field action on 
the part of the brain.  Instead, the idea is that the neuronal mechanisms accounting for 
cognition are very widely, if not uniformly, distributed throughout the brain. Indeed, it 
now seems increasingly likely that almost all of the brain may be responding to 
virtually any kind of cognitive activity once beyond the sensory and motor areas 
where localization does obviously hold! This is important because it raises questions 
about the existence of specialized localized regions of the brain, a central postulate of 
much of today’s theory.   
Robust evidence supporting widely distributed brain states (as opposed to 
localized activations) of cognitive activity has now begun to appear in the literature 
(e.g., Gonzales-Castillo et al 2012; Thyreau et al, 2012.) Both of these groups of 
investigators presented compelling data that the apparent separation of brain responses 
into localized regions or operational nodes may be an artifact of inadequate sample 
sizes, arbitrary p values, statistical biases, and a prevailing presupposition of sparse 
localization. Gonzales-Castillo and his colleagues, for example, suggested that when 
adequate sample sizes (up to 500) were used to average brain images, localized 
activation areas tended to disappear to be replaced by what is nearly a uniform overall 
activation of the entire brain. They did not exclude some relatively large regional 
differences but they concluded that: 
… under optimal noise conditions, fMRI activations extend well beyond areas of 
primary relationship to the task; and blood-oxygen level-dependent signal changes 
correlated with task timing appear in over 95% of the brain for a simple visual 
stimulation plus attention control task. (p. 5487) 
Thyreau et al (2012) also reported a similar experimental result in which they 
also used a very large subject sample (n=1326) and found generally the same result—
widespread distribution of responses across the entire brain for even the most 
elementary cognitive process. They pointed out that when very large samples were 
used, as expected, even small responses began to achieve statistical significance; this 
expansion increased until virtually all of the regions of the brain were responding 
significantly. The important implication of their work, like that of Gonzales-Castillo 
and his colleagues, was that the apparent segregation of the human brain into 
cognitively specialized regions associated with particular cognitive processes or brain 
activation nodes was probably an artifact of inadequate sample size. 
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In sum, the brain is not a system of isolated operation-specific nodes; it is more 
likely to be a broadly distributed system of neural mechanisms that are neither 
operation-specific nor localizable whose responses are wide spread and relatively 
uniform. Although there may be some discrepancies in effect size at each of many 
points, the idea of specialized locales is generally not supported. 
On The Reliability And Replicability Of fMRI Data 
The next empirical issue is—how reliable are macroneural data? In the past two 
decades, the body of the cognitive neuroscience literature based mainly on fMRI 
measures has ballooned. As is usual in the case of psychological research, there are a 
very large number of possible parameters that can be studied. Therefore, we would 
expect that exact replications of experiments to be relatively rare. Indeed, only a few 
investigators have made a determined effort to study the replicability of cognitively 
related findings. Those that have typically report that replicability in cognitive 
neuroscience is elusive and that experiments that seem to be very close in intent and 
design may produce different estimates of which brain mechanisms are involved in 
any particular cognitive process. Observations of inconsistency appear in repeated 
trials on a single subject, in comparisons of pools of subjects and interexperiment 
comparisons, and among the relatively few meta-analytic studies in which data from a 
number of experiments are pooled.  
The most disconcerting of these comparisons are obtained from single subjects 
repeating exactly the same protocol. As a measure of replicability this single-subject, 
repeated-measures design is the most stringent test possible since a maximum number 
of factors are controlled. Among the few investigators who studied the variability of 
data obtained from single subjects were Aquirre, Zarahn, and D’Eposito (1998), 
McGonigle et al (2000), and Miller et al (2002). One of the few recent reports that 
have specifically studied the problem of reliability in comprehensive detail was 
published by Bennett and Miller (2010). Examination of the figures from other reports 
(e.g., Lund et al, 2005), which were not specifically studies of single subject 
replicability, also shows substantial intrasubject variation for explicitly cognitive 
tasks. Furthermore, Rau et al (2007), for example, reported that a naming task 
produced highly variable data concerning the location and extent of Broca’s area, one 
of the most widely accepted associations of brain regions and cognitive processes. 
This inconsistency was partially ameliorated by pairing it with a noun generating task. 
Duncan et al (2009) also reported low levels of intrasubject consistency and reliability 
when brain scans of interest were compared. 
The question of reliability or replicability remains contentious, however. Maitra, 
Roys, and Gullapalli (2002) have argued that variability was modest. Aron, Gluck, 
and Poldrack (2006) and others reported a high degree of reliability in an experimental 
protocol—a “probabilistic classification learning” task—with a one–year interval 
between the test and retest portions of the experiment. However, even this work 
showed some evidence of changes over the one year period between the original test 
and the retest.  
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What may appear to be a conflict in findings may be resolvable by noting that the 
least variable brain responses were produced by motor tasks (e.g. Maitra, Roys, and 
Gullapalli) whereas the more variable responses were associated with higher level 
cognitive tasks (e.g., McGonigle et al, 2000). The problem of single subject reliability 
remains quite controversial as evidenced in a recent updated discussion of his original 
work by McGonigle (2012) and reevaluations of these results by Smith et al (2005) 
who disputed McGonigle et al’s (2000) original claim that intersession variability was 
unacceptably high. 
The intrasubject variability of the fMRI responses reported by Aquirre et al, 
McGonigle, and Miller and their groups, respectively, highlights the inconsistency of 
macroneural results especially those from repeated measures on a single subject. 
Although a few investigators (e.g., Mikl et al, 2008) have attempted to develop data 
manipulation methods to “smooth” the variability, the basic conundrum remains—is 
variability an artifact of our instrumentation and experimental protocols, or is it a real 
psychobiological property of our subjects? If the former, future technical 
developments may resolve the problem: If, on the other hand, the latter is true, then 
the entire enterprise of using brain imaging in the search for the neural bases of 
cognition probably should be critically reevaluated.  
Whatever the resolution of these debates, there is no question that intrasubject 
variability is less than intersubject comparisons in an episodic retrieval task. This is 
shown in Table 2 from Miller et al (2002). 
Table 2 
Intra- and Intersubject Correlations in an Episodic Memory Task (after Miller et al., 
2002.)  
 
In this table, correlations are shown between subjects and within subjects for two 
repetitions of an experiment in episodic memory. The low correlations between 
different subjects are not surprising. However, even the higher, but still relatively 
modest levels of correlation, when the same subjects were retested (as indicated by the 
scores along the diagonal) suggests a lack of consistency that challenges the very basis 
of the macroneural approach. 
A high level of variability is also observed when comparing experiments. A 
graphic depiction of interexperiment variability within a restricted domain of 
cognitive neuroscience—emotions—is shown in Figure 1. This figure is a typical map 
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of the raw distribution of activation areas reported from a number of what were 
presumed to be related experiments.  
Figure 1.  437 Activation Peaks Generated from 162 Experiments on Emotion 
(From Kober et al, 2008, with the Permission of the Publisher.) 
 
These records show the very wide distribution of responses to what were the same 
stimuli for a large number of experiments. This is compelling evidence for the large 
amount of variability observed in fMRI experiments. 
The next step in considering variability is to compare meta-analyses. A graphic 
comparison of seven meta-analyses carried out for working memory is shown in Table 
3 to illustrate the diversity of results obtained in this comparison of meta-analyses. 




A Comparison of Seven Meta-analyses dealing with Working Memory (from Uttal, 
2013). 
 
Note.  *BA = Brodmann Areas 
The results of this comparison are also clear—there was substantial variation 
among the areas reported by the seven meta-analyses for what were considered to be 
nearly the same cognitive process; this illustrates, at another level of analysis the 
relatively high degree of variability observed in this kind of experiment.  
In sum, the relatively rare currently available comparisons of intrasubject, 
intersubject, interexperiment, inter-meta-analysis variability (see Uttal, 2013 for an 
extended discussion of reliability in fMRI experiments), raise serious questions about 
the possibility that a neuroreductionist theory of cognition will be forthcoming. Any 
plausible theory depends on a foundation of reliable data and there is a serious 
question about replicability in these macroneural measurements. There is, perhaps, no 
more important task for cognitive science than the resolution of the empirical crisis in 
replicability and reliability.  
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New Developments; Can They Provide A Pathway To Neuroreductive 
Explanation? 
Clearly, there must be a continuing effort to overcome the obstacles to 
understanding how brain activity becomes mental activity. New methods are 
constantly being suggested, some of which are aimed at improving data collection and 
analysis methodology, some at proposing alternative methods of dealing with 
networks, and some of which try to develop alternative concepts or forms of the basic 
question of mind-brain relationships. It is questionable, however, if any of these new 
developments will overcome the difficulties involved in this awesome task. False 
hopes appear at both the macroneural and microneural levels as logic and empirical 
evidence fail us. Some of this confusion is due to the misunderstanding that not all 
progress in brain science or psychology is relevant to cognitive neuroscience. Great 
strides in brain anatomy and neurophysiology, psychological theory, and computer 
simulation do not always lead us to sustainable ideas about how the brain produces or 
becomes cognitive activity. 
For example, recent efforts at making the brain visually transparent (Chung and 
Deisseroth, 2013) are magnificent tools for visualizing the anatomy of brain tissue. 
However, it is not equally clear how such images might contribute to mind-brain 
relations. After all is said and done, they are post- mortem studies about macroneural 
anatomy. Similarly, the development of devices such as the Diffusion Tensor MRI 
(Westin et al, 2002) has provided detailed information about the anatomy of the tracts 
interconnecting brain regions; but this anatomical magnificence has not yet been 
shown to directly contribute to a neuroreductionist explanation of cognitive processes. 
An increasing number of investigators have directed their attention to the general 
problems of network organization. This can be approached from two points of view—
large scale and neuronal-level networks.  Meehan and Bressler (2012) and Bressler 
and Menon (2010) dealt with networks in a mainly qualitative way exploring the 
principles of brain organization that might guide future research. Stam and van 
Straaten (2012) extend the discussion to the particulars of networks—edges, nodes, 
and connectivity. Barrett and Satpute (2013) link the operation of these large scale 
networks to a particular cognitive state—emotion. 
Many of the new approaches are based on the idea of networks of interacting 
macroneural nodes. All of these macroneural theories depend on mapping cognitive 
processes onto what is now appreciated to be at least a group of brain structures and at 
most near universal participation by all parts of the brain. They, thus, provide an 
organizational theme for testing computer models of how the brain might be 
organized to produce a particular cognitive process. However, despite partially 
successful simulations such as those by Schroll, Vitay, and Hamker (2012) and by 
Ashby, Ennis, and Spiering (2007) it adds to the argument that this macroneural 
network approach is not an appropriate level at which to attack the mind-brain 
problem. 
Alternatives to the traditional approach of mapping specific cognitive modules 
onto what are now better considered to be combinations of brain nodes are now 
ARE NEUROREDUCTIONIST EXPLANATIONS OF COGNITION POSSIBLE?  Page 55 of 28 
 
 55 
beginning to appear. The constructionist approach championed by Lindquist and 
Barrett (2012) is an effort to shift the conceptual mode of attack on the mind-brain 
problem. Instead of the traditional effort to selectively map cognitive modules onto 
localized brain regions, they propose a “constructionist” approach in which there are 
no operationally committed macroneural nodes, only broadly distributed, 
multioperational regions that are recruited as necessary to represent or encode 
cognitive processes. Should this reconceptualization be accurate, much of the work 
done previously on mapping cognitive processes to specific brain structures (nodes) 
would become irrelevant. Of course, this new conceptualization is also subject to 
many of the practical and conceptual problems discussed already. 
Furthermore, not all new developments in statistical methodology solve 
preexisting problems; some may actually exacerbate the problems. The poor signal-to-
noise ratios characteristic of brain image data has generated a need for evermore 
powerful statistical procedures to extract the signals. It is not uncommon, however, for 
novel techniques designed to overcome spurious measurement artifacts (such as head 
movements and breathing) to generate new difficulties. Band pass filtering and 
statistical comparisons with known sources of noise are now sequentially being 
applied to remove noise from fMRI signals (Hallquist, Hwang, and Luna, in Press). 
However, this dual correction produces results that depend on the order in which the 
two corrective steps are applied to the data and, therefore, may lead to not only false 
data and ultimately false conclusions. 
Other new developments have been proposed as means to understanding 
neuronal networks. For example, Optogenetics (Deisseroth, 2011) has been offered as 
a method for activating “cell-type specific” patterns of brain activity based on genetic 
peculiarities by making types of cells responsive to light. However, this powerful 
technique does not, as sometimes implied (e.g., the use of ambiguous phrases 
“specific optogenetic inhibition of excitatory neurons” by Goshen et al, 2011), permit 
the idiosyncratic activation or inhibition of individual neurons in the manner required 
by a putative microneural theory. Instead, this method is limited to synchronously 
activating many neurons sharing a common neurochemistry. In other words, 
optogenetics is, like the fMRI, a macroneural approach that does not permit the 
simultaneous control of individual neurons.      
Other approaches attempt to overcome our inability to study microlevel 
organization by applying mathematical techniques to pool idiosyncratic neuronal 
responses. Mean-field theory (Arbib, 2003), for example, creates a single 
representative value to represent the cumulative or averaged activity of the involved 
neurons. In other words, it converts an intractable many-body (microneural) problem 
into a one-body (macroneural) problem that is supposedly capable of solution. Similar 
techniques are commonly used in physics to overcome the numerousness problem by 
pooling individual responses; however, the idea works there because the interacting 
force (gravity) is uniform. This simplifying property is not available in real neuronal 
networks where each neuron and each synapse is responding in a plethora of different 
patterns of interaction. 
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Empirical support for the postulate that the essence of the mind-brain issue lies at 
the microneural level of the states of individual neurons is, as we have seen, difficult 
to obtain but logically compelling. Attention at the microneural level has, therefore, 
turned in distinctive ways to neuronal networks. Cognition, according to this 
approach, arises from the integrated, collective, action of many neurons. Neurons, the 
postulate asserts, maintain their individual operational integrity despite the fact that 
many of them have to be linked together to represent a cognitive process. To 
understand neural networks from this point of view, we must preserve the properties 
of the individual neurons and their interconnections—an almost impossible task.  
If a direct neurophysiological approach to the study of cognitively plausible 
neuronal networks is exceedingly difficult, the main alternative is computer 
simulation. This approach aims to use what we know of the microanatomy of the brain 
to construct plausible computational models of what necessarily has to be a simplified 
simulated neuronal network. A recent review of this approach (de Garis et al, 2010) 
points out that simulations are now becoming possible in which the action and 
interaction of millions of neurons can be evaluated. However, they also point out that, 
with the exception of a few locales, we do not know enough about the actual 
organization of the brain to make these simulations neuroscientifically significant. 
This has become a highly controversial matter with some investigators challenging the 
biological relevance of very large networks of detailed simulations of neurons. 
“Neuroscientifically insignificant” does not mean, however, that these simulations are 
not valuable. An enormous amount has been learned about the interactions of complex 
networks in general. However, simulation of large scale neuronal networks suffers 
from many of the practical combinatorial problems precluding direct physiological 
research on real neuronal networks—how should the parameters of each neuron be set 
and how can their coordinated activity be measured?      
An alternative and essentially macroneural way to approach computational 
simulation of brain processes that does depend on cognitive processes is what 
Goertzel et al (2010) refer to as Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architecture (BICA). 
Rather than operating at the microneural level, BICA models are much more closely 
linked to psychology using modules of cognition such as learning, attention, and 
working memory as the elements of their simulations. This type of model, long 
familiar to psychology in the form of block diagram models, is enabled in this new 
world of supercomputers by their ability to more powerfully and definitively evaluate 
the plausibility of a descriptive explanation of cognition than was previously possible. 
Unfortunately, this kind of computer simulation reinforces what may well be an 
incorrect emphasis on “chunks” of the brain and “modules” of the brain just as the 
microneural networks of large scale computers direct our attention to that kind of 
theory. Both of these approaches, I suggest, are examples of technology forcing 
theory.  
Despite the promise each of these two computational approaches has to their 
respective fields, there is a vast gulf of ignorance regarding how the two levels of 
simulation (microneural networks and cognitive module networks) might be 
connected. As Goertzel and his colleagues note: 
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One fairly obvious phenomenon worth drawing attention to is the gap between the 
BICA and brain simulation [microneuronal network] approaches. Both approaches 
seek to leverage recent advances in hardware and neuroscience to create artificial 
brains, but so far the two approaches display very different strengths (p. 47-48). 
Conclusions 
This review of the current status of neuroreductionist explanation in cognitive 
neuroscience highlights some of the formidable barriers that obstruct our hopes of 
building a comprehensive, overarching, neuroreductionist, physicalist account of how 
mental activities emerge from brain activities. It is not yet known which of these 
barriers, if any, might prove to be surmountable and which may permanently obstruct 
our efforts. However, they collectively raise serious questions about whether or not a 
neuroreductionist explanation of mind-brain relations will ever be achieved. At the 
very least, it appears that the current idea of mapping the brain into a pattern of 
localized, operation-specific, macroneural, activation regions is less and less 
supportable. This may be true only in the genetic older or peripheral portions of the 
nervous system, but it certainly seems inappropriate in the context of those brain 
operations that underlay cognition. On the other hand, practical problems, complexity, 
and combinatorics probably preclude the microneural approach that seems logically 
more plausible. 
Speaking about the future of the macroneural approach, Poldrack (2010) asserted 
that it may be an impossible task in its present form. He noted that “a review of the 
neuroimaging literature suggests that selective association between mental processes 
and brain structures is currently impossible to find.” (p. 754) 
By “selective association” he is referring to unique associations between a 
cognitive process and one or more a brain areas. Poldrack went on, “… nearly every 
such claim [of a selective association] uncovers counterexamples that are difficult to 
reconcile with a selective structure-function mapping.” (p. 755)   
To move forward, Poldrack suggested that we must develop “ontologies” or 
“taxonomies” of cognitive processes (i.e., better definitions), explicitly accepting the 
fact that our previous attempts at classifying cognitive processes were inadequate. 
Considering that psychology has been unsuccessfully attempting to do this for 
centuries, “ontological” development is likely to be an elusive goal. 
If a comprehensive explanation of how cognitive process emerge from brain 
activity is unachievable in the near future, can we at least hope for some kind of 
predictive and descriptive prototheory through the use of macroneural measures? 
There will always be loose metaphors, hypothetical constructs, and behavior-
producing simulations that mimic cognitive processes; but a necessary and 
explanatory neural theory of mental activity is not on the horizon. The evidence so far 
and the portents for the future simply do not justify any optimism concerning an 




The best we can do, in my personal opinion, is to hope for some descriptions, 
metaphors, or other kinds of proto-theories. We obviously will make progress in many 
different aspects of cognitive neuroscience and invent interesting metaphors and 
observe correlations. However, a truly neuroreductive explanation of how the mind 
emerges from the brain in the sense achieved in cosmological theory is not yet 
available and is not likely to become available without some kind of a major 
conceptual, empirical, or methodological breakthrough. The common 
misunderstanding that correlation alone can serve as the basis for a theory is probably 
as misleading today as it was in Yule’s (1899). A solution to the mind-brain 
conundrum remains as elusive today as it has been for millennia. 
What has this to say about the optimum future course of psychology?  Although 
it is impossible to predict the future, the ensemble of difficulties with 
neuroreductionism suggests that for the time being our most advantageous approach to 
the problem of understanding psychology will come not from a fruitless 
neuroreductionist effort but from a science with the following properties or 
approaches. 
Mathematically descriptive: Use formal methods to describe and predict 
cognitive activity with the understanding that mathematical models can be sufficient 
but not necessary. 
Neuronally nonreductive: Eschew neural explanations of cognition given the 
many conceptual and empirical problems highlighted in this article. Most cognitive 
neuroscientists accept the observation of scholars such as Koch and Greenfield that 
we have “utterly failed to satisfactorily explain how subjective experience is created” 
(2007, p. 76) and Sporn that “neuroscience still cannot answer the ‘big questions’ 
about mind and intelligence” (2011, p. 179). 
Cognitively nonreductive: Acknowledge that hypothetical constructs and 
cognitive modules are underdetermined (MacCorquodale and Meehl, 1948). The idea 
of parsing psychological activity into modular components may be an experimental 
convenience, but an impediment to progress. 
Empirical: Concentrate on the overt and measurable behavioral correlates and 
properties of cognitive activity rather than the inferred parameters.    
 In conclusion, in this article I have pointed out that there are two main 
empirical approaches to mind-brain explanation. The first is the very popular 
macroneural approach based on cumulative data forthcoming from brain images. The 
second is the microneural approach based on the Hebbian conjecture of synaptic 
changes among neurons. Both of these approaches are currently challenged by major 
barriers and difficulties, many of which appear to be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to overcome. This should not be interpreted to mean that we should cease 
to study the brain at all levels and using all approaches; there is much to be learned 
about both cognition and brain operation. However, no clear trajectory about how to 
build a bridge between mind and brain has yet emerged. For the moment at least, the 
answer to the question asked in the title of this article is certainly “not now.” 
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